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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
An application that is accessed by users over a network such as the Internet or an Intranet.is 
called a Web Application [1]. Organizations use web applications to make their data available over 
the network. Attackers exploit the vulnerabilities in web applications to access sensitive data stored 
by the organization. SQLIA, SQL Injection Attack is a common vulnerability that prevails in web 
application. 
SQLIA classified under Injection attacks in OWASP [2], usually occurs in web 
applications due to insufficient input validations. In this type of attack, the attacker submits SQL 
commands as input to the web application, which when executed in the backend database can 
cause harmful transaction. The attacker can either access sensitive information from the database 
or challenge the integrity of the data stored in the database. 
OWASP, Open Web Application Security Project, considers SQLIA as one of the most 
serious security threats in web applications. It also considers SQLIA as top ten web application 
vulnerabilities of 2013[2]. FireHost, a secure cloud hosting company reports that there has been 
an estimated 69 percent increase of SQL Injection Attacks in the year 2012.[3] 
SQL Injection Attack Example 
A simple SQLIA is explained here. A web application is developed to view details of the 
Employees, stored in a database. A web application developer uses SQL query to access the 
records from database. The following is the query written by the developer: 
A valid user enters the employee ID in this field. The query below represents the status of 
the query written by developer after a valid user input is passed 
Query: Select * from Employee where EmployeeID = {0};   {0} represents the user input. 
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Valid Query: Select * from Employee where EmployeeID = 1234 
An attacker trying to inject SQLIA, enters SQL token in the user input field, which when 
executed in the back ground causes harmful transactions. The query below represents the status of 
the attacker query. The attacker has used SQL keyword OR in the user input field. 
Attacker Query: Select * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 6547 OR ‘a’=’a’. 
By including the OR keyword the attacker has successfully gained access to the employee 
records. 
Classification of SQLIA 
Detecting SQLIA has been a great challenge to the researchers. Good programming 
practices such as defensive programming and complex input validations can be used to prevent 
SQLIA in some cases. Such programming practices take a lot of time and become very complex 
for larger systems. Also attackers try to get around these programming practices by finding new 
exploits in the web application [4][5][6]. 
There have been a lot of approaches proposed by the researchers to detect and prevent 
SQLIA. The efficiency of these approaches is calculated by the range of SQL injection attacks 
detected and also by the simplicity of the approach. There are various forms of SQLIA and they 
are classified into different groups based on the intent of attackers. The following are the 
classification of SQLIA 
1. Tautology based attacks 
2. Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries 
3. Union query 
4. Piggy backed query 
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5. Stored Procedures 
6. Inference 
7. Alternate Encoding 
8. Second order injection 
An ideal SQL Injection detection algorithm should detect all the types of SQL injection 
attack mentioned above. 
Execution plans 
Execution plans available in SQL server tells us how a query is executed in the database. 
It is analogous to blue print for constructing a building. Execution plans are generated by the query 
optimizer, component responsible for calculating an optimal way to execute a query. Execution 
plans are used by the Database administrators to troubleshoot poorly performing query. Execution 
plans are widely used in query optimization. 
There are two types of execution plans: Actual and Estimated. Estimated execution plans 
are generated from the view of an optimizer. Actual execution plan are generated when the query 
is executed. Actual and Estimated execution plans can be different in some cases as Estimated 
execution plans are predicted by the query optimizer.  
Properties of an Execution plan: 
 An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query. The following are the 
significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
o Database name 
o Table name 
o Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
o Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
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 Defines the nature of the query. An execution plan helps us in identifying the type of 
DML/ DDL query that is executed. 
 The where clause in an execution plan is computed/ optimized. 
Example: 
Execution plans can be easily obtained in SQL server. It can be viewed in three formats: 
Graphical, Text and XML. Understanding an execution plan is easy and less time consuming. 
Proposed Solution 
This thesis presents an approach for detecting SQLIA using Execution Plans in SQL server. 
As execution plans are available only in SQL Server, we assume that our web application uses 
SQL server as its backend databases. Even though execution plans are available only in the SQL 
server, the concept of query optimizer constructing an optimal plan to execute a query exists in 
other databases as well. Oracle uses explain plan to optimize queries. However this thesis explains 
how an execution plan can be used for detecting SQLIA. 
The proposed approach monitors for the structural changes in the query written in web 
application to detect SQLIA. The changes in structure of a query are monitored using execution 
plans. Two execution plans are generated. One execution plan is generated from the query written 
by the web developer. This execution plan represents the structure of the intended query. The other 
execution plan is generated when the query written by the developer is executed. This execution 
plan represents the structure of the executed query. These two execution plans are compared for 
structural changes in the query. Changes in the structure of the queries are reported as SQLIA. 
Query:  Select * from Employees Where EmployeeID =1234 or 1=1 is optimized in execution 
plan as Select * from Employees. 
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The objects available in the execution plans define the structure of a query. When two 
execution plans are compared, the occurrence of objects in each execution plans are compared. A 
query has changed its structure if  
1. An object is not present in the execution plan. 
2. A new object is included in the execution plan. 
3. Number of occurrence of an object is changed in the execution plan. 
The approach is evaluated against all types of SQLIA. A Windows Application tool is 
developed to compare two queries using execution plan approach. The approach is compared with 
other tools that are available for detecting SQLIA. 
Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Detection algorithm for SQLIA. 
The approach proposes a new detection algorithm to detect SQLIA using execution plan in 
SQL server.   
2. Evaluating the algorithm against all the types of SQLIA. 
The proposed approach is evaluated against each type of SQLIA. Explanation of how 
execution plan is used to detect each of this approach is explained. 
3. Comparing with other approaches. 
The proposed approach is compared with other approaches available in detecting SQLIA. 
The efficiency of the algorithms are discussed based on the range of SQLIA detected, 
simplicity of the algorithm and false positive/ false negative rates.  
4. An implementable framework. 
Two applications are developed.  
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a) A windows application that compares two queries using execution plans in C#. 
b) Web application architecture with IDS installed. The IDS includes the 
implementation of execution plan approach. 
Roadmap 
The rest of this work is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present a review of related 
work in this research area. Then we present our approach to detect SQLIA in Chapter 3. Chapter 
4 describes the implementation of the detection algorithm, and compares our approach with other 
detection approaches. Finally, we conclude with a discussion and opportunities for future 
development in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 
With the advent of such a harmful attack, researchers have discovered various detection 
and prevention techniques for SQLIA. There has been a lot of effort spent in understanding the 
attack and its effect in web applications. Based on the understanding of the attack, SQLIA was 
classified into various categories based on the intent of the attack. Understanding the classes of 
SQLIA is significant, in crafting an algorithm to detect it. Various algorithms have been proposed 
to detect and prevent SQLIA. The underlying technique used in these algorithms determines the 
effectiveness of detecting SQLIA. This section discusses the classification of SQLIA and the 
techniques used by existing algorithm in detecting and preventing SQLIA. 
Classification of SQLIA 
Tautology based SQLIA 
The aim of this attack is to inject code in one or more conditional statements so that it 
always evaluates to true. This type of attack is mostly used in authentication pages 
Example: 
The query used from [7][8][9][10] is to retrieve the records of an employee whose ID is 
1234. The attacker using tautology based attacks retrieves information of all employees. 
Intended query: Select * from Employees where EmpID = 1234 
Attacker query: Select * from Employees where EmpID = 1234 or ‘a’=’a’ 
Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries 
This attack is based on the fact that error messages generated by an application can often 
reveal significant information to attackers. The attacker injects statements that cause syntax, type 
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conversion and logical errors in the database. The attacker uses the error message retrieved from 
the database to get significant information about the database. 
Example: 
The query used in this example [7][9][10][11] is for an ATM login page. The user enters 
pin information as input to the query. 
Intended query: Select * from users where pin = 1234 
Attacker query: Select * from users where pin=  
                                       convert(int,(select top 1 name from sysobjects where xtype=’u’)) 
 
Assuming that CreditCards is the first table in our database, the attacker query would return 
the following error message. 
”Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server (0x80040E07) Error converting nvarchar 
value ’CreditCards’ to a column of data type int.” 
Union based SQIA 
In this method, the UNION keyword is used to change the dataset returned for a given 
query. Attackers join the injected query to the original query by using the UNION keyword. 
Example: 
The query used from [7][9][10][12] is to retrieve employee name from the database. 
Intended query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234 
Attacker query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234 UNION  
                Select name from SYSOBJECTS. 
The attacker query retrieves the name of all the tables available in the database. 
9 
 
Piggy-Backed Queries 
In this type of attack, the attackers inject additional queries to the original queries. The 
intentions of the attacker are not to modify the original query but to include new queries that 
“piggy-backs” on the original query. This results in SQL server executing multiple unintended 
queries. 
Example: 
The query used in this example [7][9][10][11] is to retrieve employee name from the 
database. 
Intended query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234 
Attacker query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234;  
                DROP TABLE Employee; 
The attacker query has an additional drop statement in it. When SQL server executes the 
attacker query, the Employees table will be dropped. 
Stored Procedures 
One of the most common misconceptions is that using stored procedures in web application 
can avoid SQLIA. Stored procedures are as vulnerable as normal queries [18][24]. In addition, as 
stored procedures are written in special scripting languages, they contain additional vulnerabilities 
such as buffer flows, which allows attackers to un arbitrary code on the server [9]. 
The following example from [7][8][9][10][11][13][14][15][16] is a stored procedure that 
is used to authenticate a user. The user provides username, password and pin for authorization. 
CREATE PROCEDURE DBO.isAuthenticated @userName varchar(20), @pass varchar(10), 
@pin int 
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AS 
EXEC("SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’" +@userName+ "’ and pass=’" 
+@password+ "’ and pin=" +@pin); 
GO 
The attacker injects SHUTDOWN in either the username or password field and the query is 
changed to 
Attacker query: SELECT accounts FROM user WHERE login=’abc’ AND pass=’ ‘;  
                SHUTDOWN; -- AND pin= 
Inference 
In this type of attack, the attackers inject the query to understand the behavior of the web 
site. These types of attack are carried on secure websites, where the error messages from databases 
are blocked. Attackers deduce that certain parameters in the web site are vulnerable, by carefully 
the noting the changes in the behavior of the web site. There are two types of Inference attacks: 
Blind SQL Injection Attack:  
In this technique, the attacker asks server true/false questions to understand the behavior 
of a web page. The web page acts normally, when the injected statements evaluates to true. The 
web page differs significantly from normal behavior, when the injected statements evaluate to true. 
The following example explains Blind SQLIA. 
Example:  
The query used in this example is used to authenticate a user. The user provides username, 
password and pin for authorization. 
Intended query: SELECT account from users WHERE login=’abc’ and password = ‘ ’ and 
pin =0 
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The attacker wants to identify injectable parameters. In our example we assume that the 
attacker is trying to inject the login field. The following are the two possible injections into the 
login ﬁeld representing true/ false. The ﬁrst being 
“legalUser’ and 1=0 - -” and the second, “legalUser’ and 1=1 - -”. 
Attack Query: SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’legalUser’ and 1=0 -- ’ AND 
pass=’’ AND pin=0 
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’legalUser’ and 1=1 -- ’ AND pass=’’ AND 
pin=0. 
There are two possible scenarios: 
 Login input field is validated: 
In this scenario, both the injections mentioned above will return login error messages. Thus 
attacker would know that login field is not vulnerable. 
 Login input field is not validated: 
In this scenario, the first injection which always evaluates to false will always result in login error 
messages from the application. But the second injection which always evaluates to true will not 
return login error messages. Thus attacker identifies that login field is vulnerable to attacks. 
Timing Attacks:  
Timing attacks is based on inference. Here the attacker uses the time taken by a query to 
execute in the server, to gain information about the database. A timing attack is performed by 
forming an injected if/then statement. Along one of the branches, the attacker uses a SQL construct 
that takes a known amount of time to execute. By measuring the increase or decrease in response 
time that attacker can infer which branch was taken in SQL injection. 
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Example:  
The query used in this example[10][17][18] is to is used to authenticate a user. The user 
provides username, password and pin for authorization. 
Intended query: SELECT account from users WHERE login=’abc’ and password = ‘ ’ and 
pin =0 
Attacker query: SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’abc’ and 
ASCII(SUBSTRING((select top 1 name from sysobjects),1,1)) > X WAITFOR 5 -- ’ AND 
pass=’’ AND pin=0. 
In the attacker query, substring keyword is used to extract the first character of the first 
table’s name. The attacker in this is asking if the ASCII value of the character is greater than or 
less than the value of x. If the value is greater than x, the attacker observes a 5 second delay in the 
response of the database. The attacker then uses binary search strategy to identify the value of the 
first character. 
Alternate Encodings 
This type of attack is to overcome the defensive coding practices. Alternate encoding is 
used in conjunction with other attacks. Defensive coding practices scans for certain known “bad 
characters” to detect SQLIA. To evade this method the injected query string is encoded using 
hexadecimal, ASCII and Unicode etc.  
Example:  
The query used in this example [7][10][11] is to is used to authenticate a user. The user 
provides username, password and pin for authorization. 
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Intended query: SELECT account from users WHERE login=’abc’ and password = ‘ ’ and 
pin =0 
Attacker query: SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’legalUser’; 
exec(char(0x73687574646f776e)) -- AND pass=’’ AND pin= 
The attacker query encodes the string value SHUTDOWN before injecting it in the query. 
Second Order Injection 
In this type of attack the injected query is stored as data in the database and is executed 
when the data is requested in the search query. This is a two level attack. First the attacker inserts 
a harmful query into the database as data. 
Example:  
Attacker query: Insert into Users (name,age,profile) Values(‘abc’,32,’’’; 
DELETE FROM USERS;--‘) 
When this query [10] is executed, the attacker has successfully inserted the query string 
“DELETE FROM USERS” into the Users table.  
The stored query string does not cause any problems until it is retrieved by another query. 
Once the harmful stored query string is retrieved, the SL server considers it as separate query 
statement and executes it. 
Intended query: Select * from Users where profile = {0} 
Attacker query: Select * from Users where profile=’’; DELETE FROM USERS; 
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Existing Detection and Prevention techniques of SQLIA 
The following are the existing techniques that are used in detecting and preventing SQLIA. 
These techniques range from development best practices to fully automated frameworks.  
Defensive coding practices 
SQL Injection is caused by lack of input validation. There are various defensive coding 
practices [7][10] to prevent SQLIA.  
a) Input type checking: Developers need to check the input provided in the web application. 
The checks can be avoiding character in the numeric field, providing length constraints etc.  
b) Encoding of inputs: The Meta characters can be specially encoded and interpreted by 
database as normal characters. 
c) Positive pattern matching: A safer way to check inputs. Developers identify good inputs as 
opposed to bad inputs. Developers specify all the forms of legal input. 
d) Identification of all input sources: Identifying all the input sources to the application is 
significant. When used to construct a query, these input sources are used by attackers to 
insert SQLIA. 
Black Box Testing 
WAVES [19], proposed by Huang and colleagues is a black box testing technique for 
testing web applications for SQLIA. A web crawler is used to identify the points in web application 
which can be used to inject SQLIA. Using a specific list of patterns and attack techniques, WAVES 
attack the target points identified. WAVES then monitors the applications response to the attacks 
and uses machine learning techniques to improve its attack methodology. 
15 
 
Static Code Checkers 
JDBC-Checker [20][21] checks for type correctness of dynamically generated SQL 
queries. It is able to detect improper type checking of input. This technique was not developed to 
detect and prevent SQLIA, but can be used to prevent attacks that take advantage of type 
mismatches in a dynamically generated query string. The disadvantage of this technique is that 
most of the attacks consist of syntactically and type correct queries. 
Combined Static and Dynamic Analysis 
AMNESIA [22][23], uses static analysis and run time monitoring to detect SQLIA. During 
the static analysis phase, AMNESIA builds a model to represent the structure of the query. Before 
queries are sent to the database, they are validated against the model built during the static analysis 
phase. Queries that violate the models are considered as attack queries.  
SQL Guard [24] and SQL-Checker [25] also builds a model and check if queries conform 
to the designed model. The model is built based on a grammar that only accepts legal queries. In 
SQL Guard, the model is deduced at runtime by examining the structure of the query before and 
after the addition of user-input. In SQL Check, developer specifies the model independently. In 
both these approaches a secret key is used to delimit the user input. Thus the security of these 
approaches depends on the ability of attacker identifying the key. 
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Taint Based Approaches 
Information flow analysis is used by WebSSARI [26] to detect input validation errors. 
Static analysis is used to check taint flows against preconditions for sensitive functions. The points 
that have not met the preconditions are detected and filters are automatically added to the 
application to satisfy the preconditions. Another approach that uses information flow analysis to 
detect vulnerabilities in software was proposed by Livshits and Lam. The basic approach is to 
detect when tainted input is used to construct a SQL query. 
Dynamic taint analysis are proposed by researches as well. Approaches proposed by 
Nguyen- Tuong [27] and colleagues and Pietraszek and Berghe [28] are similar and use a context 
sensitive analysis to detect and reject queries, if untrusted input has been used to create certain 
types of SQL tokens. These approaches modify a PHP interpreter to track precise per-character 
taint information.  A similar approach for java was proposed by Haldar and Colleagues [29] and 
Securifly [30]. These approaches track taint information on a per-string basis.  
New Query Development Paradigms 
SQL DOM [31] and Safe Query Objects [32] provide a safe and reliable approach to access 
databases. A type checked API is used in query building process. Within the API, systematic ding 
best practices are applied. By changing the environment in which the queries are built, these 
techniques eliminate the coding practices that make most SQLIA possible.  
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection system was used to detect SQLIA by Valeur and colleagues [33]. The 
IDS is built based on a machine learning technique that is trained using a set of typical application 
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queries. Models of queries are built and monitored during run time to identify queries that do not 
satisfy the model. 
Proxy filters 
Security Gateway [34] is a proxy filtering system that enforces input validation rules on 
the data flowing to a web application. Developers use Security Policy Descriptor Language 
(SPDL) to provide constraints and specify transformations to be applied to application parameters 
as they flow from web page to the application server. 
Instruction Set Randomization 
SQLrand [35] is an approach based on instruction set randomization. It allows developers 
to create queries using randomized instructions instead of normal SQL keywords. A proxy filter 
de-randomizes the keywords by intercepting the queries to the database. When an attacker injects 
SQL code it would not adhere to the randomized instruction set. Table 2.1 compares the detection 
based techniques with respect to attack types.  
Table 2.1: Comparison of detection based techniques with respect to attack types 
Technique Taut. Illegal/ 
Incorrect 
Piggy-Back Union  Stored Proc Infer Alt. 
Encodings 
AMNESIA • • • • × • • 
CSSE • • • • × • × 
IDS ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 
Java Dynamic 
Tainting - - - - - - - 
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Table 2.1 continued 
SQL Guard • • • • × • • 
SQLrand • × • • × • × 
Tautology 
Checker 
• × × × × × × 
Web App 
Hardening 
• • • • × • × 
•  Technique can successfully detect the types of attack. 
◦ does not provide guarantee of completeness. 
- Technique that addresses the attack type considered only partially because of intrinsic 
limitations of the underlying approach. 
× Technique cannot detect the type of attack. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE SYSTEM METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 2 discussed the existing approaches for detecting and preventing SQLIA. One of 
the most commonly used approaches to detect SQLIA, is to build a model based on the structure 
of the query used in the web application. When the same query is executed, the query is validated 
against the model to detect SQLIA. The solution to detect SQLIA proposed in this thesis follows 
the approach mentioned above. Execution plans from SQL server are used to represent structure 
of the query i.e. are used as models. 
Execution Plans 
Execution plans from SQL server, tells us how a query will be executed. They are used 
extensively by the database administrators in optimizing SQL queries. The following are the 
properties of the Execution Plans that is used in detecting SQLIA: 
 An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query. The following are the 
significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
o Database name 
o Table name 
o Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
o Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
 Defines the nature of the query. An execution plan helps us in identifying the type of DML/ 
DDL query that is executed. 
 The where clause in an execution plan is computed/ optimized. 
Execution plan represents the structure of the query. Detecting SQLIA using execution 
plan is based on the fact that, when an attacker inserts SQL tokens as user inputs to inject SQLIA, 
20 
 
the structure of the original query changes. As the structure of the original query changes, the 
execution plan of the original query can no longer be used to execute the query. Hence a new 
execution plan, representing the structure of the modified original query, needs to be generated, to 
execute the query. 
Execution plans can be used to represent the model of input queries. Original Execution 
Plan acts as a model representing legal query structure. When the same query is executed, the 
execution plan generated could be compared with the Execution Plan of the original queries. 
Variations in the execution plan can be used to detect SQLIA. 
Assumptions 
The following are the assumptions in the Execution Plan approach in detecting SQL 
Injection attack. 
 Execution plans are for SQL server. Hence we assume that our under lying database in 
SQL server. But this technique can be extended to web applications that use other databases 
as well. This will be discussed in detail in future work section. 
 We do not assume that Execution Plan for a query will be identical every time. Execution 
Plan depends on lot of factors like table structure, indexing etc. Execution plan for the same 
query with same table structure will be different if the indexing defined in the table is 
different during the execution time of the query. We assume that the objects listed in the 
execution plan will not change for the same query. We do not compare two Execution 
Plans; we compare the objects involved the Execution Plans. 
 We rely in the integrity of the Execution Plans retrieved from the SQL Server. 
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Detecting SQLIA 
The following section illustrates an example of how an SQLIA is detected using Execution 
Plans. The query mentioned below takes an Employee ID as input and retrieves the detail of the 
employee from the database. 
Developer Query: Select * from Employee Where EmployeeID = {0}(represents user input). 
Below is an example of the query executed by a valid user. 
Valid Query: Select * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 1234 
Now an attacker tries to insert SQL token in user input to inject SQLIA. The query 
mentioned below represents an attacker query, who is trying to use ‘OR’ SQL Token. 
Attacker query: Select * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 1234 OR ‘a’=’a’. 
To detect such attacks, Execution Plans can be used. The following figures represent the 
Execution Plan of the above three queries: 
a) Developer Query: When generating execution plans for the developer query, the input of 
the query can be any random values representing a legal state of the query. The value of 
the user input does not affect the Execution Plan. In the example mentioned above, the 
user input can be any positive integer as it represents Employee ID. The following 
Execution Plan is generated considering user input as integer value 0. 
Select  * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 0 
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Figure 3.1: Graphical Execution Plan for query (Select  * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 0) 
b) Valid query:  
Select * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 1234 
23 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Graphical Execution Plan for query (Select  * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 1234) 
c) Attacker query:  
Select * from Employees Where EmployeeID = 1234 or ‘a’ =  ‘a’ 
24 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Graphical Execution Plan for query (Select * from Employee Where EmployeeID = 1234 or 
‘a’ = ‘a’) 
The Execution Plan of a query in general contains 
 Database name 
 Table name 
 Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
 Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
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From Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 we could see that Execution Plan for our queries contains 
the above mentioned objects. The Object section in the Figures represents the database and table 
name. The Output List section represents the name of the columns retrieved by the query. The 
Predicate section represents the name of the columns used in the Where clause of the query. 
By comparing the execution plans of the three queries we can identify that Execution Plans 
of developer (Figure 3.1) and valid query (Figure 3.2) are identical but Execution Plan of the 
attacker query (Figure 3.3) is different from the developer query. The Execution Plan of the 
attacker query does not have the Predicate section. This is because Execution Plans as discussed 
earlier, computes the Where clause section before executing the query. In the attacker query, the 
condition in the Where clause Where EmployeeID = 1234 OR ‘a’ = ‘a’, always renders to true and 
hence it is removed while generating Execution Plan. The original query is changed to  
Select * from Employees; 
Ignoring the where clause. The change in the Execution Plan represents a SQLIA. 
Stages involved in detecting SQLIA 
The following sections represent the stages involved in detecting SQLIA using Execution 
Plan approach. 
Stage 1: Identifying the input source 
In this stage, the web application code is analyzed to find the input sources that can cause 
SQLIA. Identification of all input sources is part of defensive coding practices, where the 
developer/ analyzer identify the places which are used by the attacker to exploit the application to 
SQLIA. 
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Stage 2: Building the model 
In this stage, a model will be built to each query identified in stage 1. Execution plans of 
the query will be used to build the model. This model represents the structure of the query expected 
by the developer. This plan can be generated either manually by the developer or can be generated 
automatically. As the models developed are different for each query, a table structure is used to 
tag each query with its corresponding model. 
Stage 3: Detecting Structural Changes 
This stage represents the execution of the query. Each time the query is executed, its 
Execution Plan is retrieved from the database. This Execution Plan is compared with the Execution 
Plan obtained in the stage 2. Difference in the Execution Plans is reported as SQLIA. 
The stages involved are explained in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4: Stages involved in detecting SQLIA using Execution Plan Approach. 
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Execution Plan approach against SQLIA 
The following section explains how Execution Plan approach is used to detect each type of SQLIA. 
The types of SQLIA were discussed in Chapter 2. As discussed earlier, Execution Plan approach 
detects the changes in the structure of the query to report SQLIA.  
Tautology based SQLIA 
Attack: The aim of this attack is to inject code in one or more conditional statements so that it 
always evaluates to true. The attacker uses SQL keywords to make conditional statements to be 
always evaluated to true. The use of WHERE clause present in the SQL query becomes void. 
Example: 
The query used in this example is to retrieve the records of an employee whose ID is 1234. The 
attacker using tautology based attacks retrieves information of all employees. 
Intended query: Select * from Employees where EmpID = 1234 
Attacker query: Select * from Employees where EmpID = 1234 or ‘a’=’a’ 
Detection: The following property of the Execution Plans is used in detecting tautology based 
SQLIA. 
The where clause in an execution plan is computed/ optimized. 
As per the property mentioned above, the attacker query in the example changes its structure to 
Attacker query: Select * from Employee; 
As the where clause is always true, it is removed from the query structure. 
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Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries 
Attack: The attacker injects statements that cause syntax, type conversion and logical errors in 
the database. The attacker uses the error message retrieved from the database to get significant 
information about the database. 
Example: 
The query used in this example is for an ATM login page. The user enters pin information as input 
to the query. 
Intended query: Select * from users where pin = 1234 
Attacker query: Select * from users where pin= convert(int,(select top 1 name from 
sysobjects where xtype=’u’)) 
Assuming that CreditCards is the first table in our database, the attacker query would return the 
following error message. 
”Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server (0x80040E07) Error converting nvarchar value 
’CreditCards’ to a column of data type int.” 
Detection: The following property of Execution Plans is used in detecting Illegal/ Incorrect 
queries. 
An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query.  
The following are the significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
 Database name 
 Table name 
 Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
 Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
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Based on the property mentioned above, insertion of new table names to the original query can be 
detected. In the example discussed, the attacker has injected new table, SYSTABLES to the query. 
Using the Execution Plan insertion of a new table to the query can be detected. 
Union based SQIA 
Attack: Attackers join the injected query to the original query by using the property of the UNION 
keyword. 
Example: 
The query used in this example is to retrieve employee name from the database. 
Intended query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234 
Attacker query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234 UNION  
                         Select name from SYSOBJECTS. 
The attacker query retrieves the name of all the tables available in the database. 
Detection: The following property of Execution Plans is used in detecting UNION based SQLIA.  
An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query.  
The following are the significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
 Database name 
 Table name 
 Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
 Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
Based on the property mentioned above, insertion of new table names to the original query can 
be detected. In the example discussed, the attacker has injected new table, SYSOBJECTS to the 
query. Using the Execution Plan insertion of a new table to the query can be detected.  
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Piggy-Backed Queries 
Attack: The intentions of the attacker are to include new queries that “piggy-backs” on the original 
query. This results in SQL server executing multiple unintended queries. 
Example: 
The query used in this example is to retrieve employee name from the database. 
Intended query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234 
Attacker query: Select name from Employees where EmployeeID=1234;  
                         DROP TABLE Employee; 
The attacker query has an additional drop statement in it. When SQL server executes the attacker 
query, the Employees table will be dropped. 
Detection: The following properties of Execution Plans are used in detecting Piggy-backed 
queries. 
An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query. 
The following are the significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
 Database name 
 Table name 
 Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
 Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
Defines the nature of the query 
An execution plan helps us in identifying the type of DML/ DDL query that is executed. 
Based on the properties mentioned above, insertion of new table names to the original query can 
be detected. Also the type of DML/ DDL statements executed by the query can be identified. In 
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the example discussed, the attacker has injected Employee table to the original query. Only one 
occurrence of Employee table is allowed. Also a new DML/ DDL statement DROP is included.   
Stored Procedures 
Attack: SQLIA carried out in stored procedure calls. 
The following is a stored procedure that is used to authenticate a user. The user provides username, 
password and pin for authorization. 
CREATE PROCEDURE DBO.isAuthenticated 
@userName varchar(20), @pass varchar(10), @pin int 
AS 
EXEC("SELECT accounts FROM users 
WHERE login=’" +@userName+ "’ and pass=’" +@password+ 
"’ and pin=" +@pin); 
GO 
The attacker injects SHUTDOWN in either the username or password field and the query is 
changed to 
Attacker query: SELECT accounts FROM user WHERE login=’abc’ AND pass=’ ‘;  
                         SHUTDOWN; -- AND pin= 
This sends shutdown signal to the database. 
Detection: 
An Execution Plan of a stored procedure is similar to that of a simple query statement. Query 
optimizer looks Stored Procedures as collection of statements, when generating Execution Plans. 
Thus by comparing Execution plans of compiled stored procedure and run time stored procedure, 
SQLIA can be detected. 
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In the above example, the attacker has inserted a new statement SHUTDOWN, which can be 
identified using Execution Plans. 
Inference 
Attack: 
In this type of attack, the attackers inject the query to understand the behavior of the web site. 
There are two types of Inference attacks. 
Blind SQLIA: 
In this technique, the attacker asks server true/false questions to understand the behavior of a web 
page.  
Example:  
The query used in this example is used to authenticate a user. The user provides username, 
password and pin for authorization. 
Intended query: SELECT account from users WHERE login=’abc’ and password = ‘ ’ and 
pin =0 
 
The attacker wants to identify injectable parameters. In our example we assume that the attacker 
is trying to inject the login field. The following are the two possible injections into the login ﬁeld 
representing true/ false. The ﬁrst being 
“legalUser’ and 1=0 - -” and the second, “legalUser’ and 1=1 - -”. 
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Attack Query: SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’legalUser’ and 1=0 -- ’ AND 
pass=’’ AND pin=0 
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’legalUser’ and 1=1 -- ’ AND pass=’’ AND 
pin=0. 
Example:  
The query used in this example is used to authenticate a user. The user provides username, 
password and pin for authorization. 
Timing attacks: 
Intended query: SELECT account from users WHERE login=’abc’ and password = ‘ ’ and 
pin =0 
Attacker query: SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’abc’ and 
ASCII(SUBSTRING((select top 1 name from sysobjects),1,1)) > X WAITFOR 5 -- ’ AND 
pass=’’ AND pin=0. 
In the attacker query, substring keyword is used to extract the first character of the first table’s 
name. The attacker in this is asking if the ASCII value of the character is greater than or less than 
the value of x. If the value is greater than x, the attacker observes a 5 second delay in the 
response of the database. The attacker then uses binary search strategy to identify the value of 
the first character. 
Detection:  
The following property of Execution Plans is used in detecting UNION based SQLIA. 
An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query.  
The following are the significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
 Database name 
 Table name 
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 Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
 Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
Based on the property mentioned above, insertion of new table names to the original query can be 
detected. In the example discussed, the attacker has injected new table, SYSOBJECTS to the 
query. Using the Execution Plan insertion of a new table to the query can be detected. Also 
insertion of new keywords such as WAITFOR can be identified in Execution Plans. 
Alternate Encodings 
Attack: This type of attack is to overcome the defensive coding practices. Alternate encoding is 
used in conjunction with other attacks. Defensive coding practices scans for certain known “bad 
characters” to detect SQLIA. To evade this method the injected query string is encoded using 
hexadecimal, ASCII and Unicode etc.  
Example: 
The query used in this example is used to authenticate a user. The user provides username, 
password and pin for authorization. 
Intended query: SELECT account from users WHERE login=’abc’ and password = ‘ ’ and 
pin =0 
Attacker query: SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’legalUser’; 
exec(char(0x73687574646f776e)) -- AND pass=’’ AND pin= 
The attacker query encodes the string value SHUTDOWN before injecting it in the query. 
Detection: The encoded characters are decoded before Query optimizer tries to generate Execution 
Plans. Thus by observing Execution Plans, SQLIA can be detected. 
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Second Order Injection 
Attack:  
In this type of attack the injected query is stored as data in the database and is executed when the 
data is requested in the search query. This is a two level attack. First the attacker inserts an harmful 
query into the database as data. 
Example:  
Attacker query: Insert into Users (name,age,profile) Values(‘abc’,32,’’’;DELETE FROM 
USERS;--‘) 
When this query is executed, the attacker has successfully inserted the query string “DELETE 
FROM USERS” into the Users table. The stored query string does not cause any problems until it 
is retrieved by another query. Once the harmful stored query string is retrieved, the SL server 
considers it as separate query statement and executes it. 
Intended query: Select * from Users where profile = {0} 
Attacker query: Select * from Users where profile=’’; DELETE FROM USERS; 
Detection: The following properties of Execution Plans are used in detecting Second Order 
Injection SQLIA. 
An execution plan contains all the objects involved in the query.  
The following are the significant objects that can be found in an Execution Plan. 
 Database name 
 Table name 
 Name of the Columns retrieved from the table 
 Name of the Columns used in the where clause of a query 
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Defines the nature of the query. 
 
An execution plan helps us in identifying the type of DML/ DDL query that is executed 
Based on the properties mentioned above, insertion of new table names to the original query can 
be detected. Also the type of DML/ DDL statements executed by the query can be identified. In 
the example discussed, the attacker has injected USERS table to the original query. Also a new 
DML/ DDL statement DROP is included.  
To summarize this section, Execution Plans can be used to detect all the classes of SQLIA. The 
properties of Execution Plans help in identifying the structural changes of the original query. A 
SQLIA is detected when the structure of the query changes. 
The Table 3.1 describes the Execution Plan approach of detecting SQLIA. It also relates the class 
of SQLIA with the property of Execution Plans that is used for detection. 
Table 3.1: Execution Plan approach of detecting SQLIA 
Attack Type Description Does attack 
query 
changes 
structure? 
Property(s) Of Exec Plan used in 
Detection 
Tautology 
Inject code in one or 
more conditional 
statements so that it 
always evaluates to 
true 
YES 
The where clause in an execution 
plan is computed/ optimized. 
 
Illegal/ Incorrect 
Injected statements 
cause syntax, type 
conversion and 
logical errors in the 
database. 
YES 
An execution plan contains all the 
objects involved in the query 
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Table 3.1 continued 
Union based 
Injected query is 
joined to the original 
query by using 
UNION keyword 
YES 
An execution plan contains all the 
objects involved in the query 
Piggy-Backed 
Inject new queries 
that “piggy-backs” on 
the original query 
YES 
An execution plan contains all the 
objects involved in the query 
Stored Procedure 
Inject queries in 
stored procedures YES 
An Execution Plan of a stored 
procedure is similar to that of a 
simple query statement 
Inference 
Blind 
SQLIA 
Inject true/false 
questions 
NOT 
ALWAYS An execution plan contains all the 
objects involved in the query Timing 
attacks 
Inject if/ then 
statements 
YES 
Alternate 
Encodings 
Inject to overcome 
defensive coding 
practices 
YES 
The encoded characters are 
decoded before Query optimizer 
tries to generate Execution Plans. 
Second Order 
Injections 
Inject to store 
harmful queries as 
data. 
YES An execution plan contains all the 
objects involved in the query. 
The following are the significant 
objects that can be found in an 
Execution Plan. 
 
An execution plan helps us in 
identifying the type of DML/ 
DDL query that is executed. 
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CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
To gain further understanding about how Execution Plans are used to detect SQL Injection 
Attacks, a web application architecture was implemented using .NET framework. ASP.NET web 
pages were developed using C# and web services were used to represent Intrusion Detection 
Systems. Details of these implementations are given below, and the results of the experiments 
using them are presented in section 4.2. 
Web Application Architecture 
Figure 4.1 shows the web application architecture that is implemented to detect SQLIA 
using the Execution Plan approach. The technology used in implementing each component is also 
indicated in Figure 4.1. The communication between each component is mentioned in the body of 
the arrow. 
 
Figure 4.1: Web Application Architecture implemented to test Execution Plan Approach  
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Web Page(s) 
The web page(s) represents the browsers which users use to access the web servers. 
ASP.NET web pages are developed using C# in the implementation. Web application developers 
define their queries to database in the web pages. Attackers use this component to break into the 
network. 
Web Server 
The web server helps to deliver the web content over a network. IIS server is used as web 
servers in the implementation. Web server receives requests from the web pages, processes the 
request and sends response to the web pages. 
Database 
A database is an organized collection of data. A database is used to store data. SQL Server 
2012 is used as database in the implementation. The data displayed or used by the web site is stored 
in the database. Web application developers write queries to access data from the database. The 
aim of the attacker is to retrieve unprivileged data from the database or to compromise the integrity 
of the data stored in the database. Intrusion detection system store their configurations and reports 
in the database. These reports are displayed to security analysts using Central Analysis Server. 
IDS systems retrieve their execution plans from the database. 
HTTP Request/ Response 
Represents the request and respond communication between web pages and webserver. 
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Database Driver 
Web server uses the database driver to access the data stored in the database. 
Intrusion Detection System 
This component is responsible for monitoring the HTTP request/ response traffic. C# web 
services are used to implement the detection algorithm. Execution Plan based approach is used in 
detecting SQLIA. The execution plans used by the IDS systems are retrieved from the database. 
IDS systems store their alerts and configurations in the database. 
Central Analysis Server 
This component is used by the security analysts to view the reports/ alerts generated by the 
IDS system 
Performance of Execution Plan Approach 
This section evaluates the performance of Execution Plan approach in detecting SQL 
Injections Attacks. This section also compares the effectiveness of the Execution Plan approach 
with other detection based approaches. 
As discussed in section 4.1, web application architecture was implemented to test the 
Execution Plan approach for detecting SQLIA. A wide set of SQLIA data sets were used to break 
into the network. These data sets included all the classification of SQLIA discussed in section 2. 
The Execution plan based approach was able to identify all the queries that represented SQLIA 
with no false positive or false negatives. The Table 4.1 compares the Execution plan based 
approach with the other detection algorithms. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of detection based techniques and execution plan approach with respect to attack 
types 
Technique Taut Illegal/ 
Incorrect 
Piggy
-Back 
Union  Stored 
Proc 
Inference Alternate 
Encodings 
Second 
Order 
AMNESIA • • • • × • • ◦ 
CSSE • • • • × • × ◦ 
IDS ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 
Java 
Dynamic 
Tainting 
- - - - - - - × 
SQL Check • • • • × • • × 
SQL Guard • • • • × • • × 
SQLrand • × • • × • × × 
Tautology 
Checker 
• × × × × × × × 
Web App 
Hardening 
• • • • × • × × 
Execution 
plan 
approach 
• • • • • • • • 
•  Technique can successfully detect the types of attack. 
◦ does not provide guarantee of completeness. 
- Technique that addresses the attack type considered only partially because of intrinsic 
limitations of the underlying approach. 
× Technique cannot detect the type of attack. 
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Advantages of Execution Plan Approach 
This section discusses the advantage of execution plan approach over other detection 
approaches in detecting SQLIA. 
Well-Developed Execution Plans 
The Execution Plans used in SQL Server are well-developed. They have been used 
extensively by the database administrators in optimizing SQL queries. The Execution Plans can 
be retrieved in three formats 
 XML 
 Text 
 Graphical 
Lowest Level Detection 
The Execution Plan approach detects SQLIA after the Execution Plan of a query is 
generated. Execution Plans are generated just before a query is executed. This can be considered 
as the lowest level of a database driven web application. Thus Execution Plan approach detects 
SQLIA at the lowest possible level. 
Secure model 
Execution Plans approach can detect SQLIA just by using the schema of the database. The 
organization can just share their schema (not data) to the security team while implementing the 
Execution Plan approach. 
 
43 
 
Stored Procedures 
Execution Plan approach detects SQLIA effectively in the stored procedures. Detecting 
SQLIA in stored procedures has been a challenge to researchers. The detection approaches 
mentioned in section 2 have either failed or partially detected SQLIA in stored procedures. 
Second Order SQLIA  
Execution Plan approach detects second order SQLIA, where the attacker stores SQL 
statements in the database which when executed causes harmful transactions. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Conclusion 
In this thesis we have presented the Execution Plan based approach for detecting SQL 
Injection Attacks in SQL Server databases. This approach uses the Execution Plans generated in 
SQL Server to detect SQLIA.  
We have shown, through the implementation and results, that Execution Plans can be used 
to detect the changes in the structure of the query, which in turn can detect SQLIA. The Execution 
Plan approach is capable of detecting all the classes of SQLIA including the class of second order 
attacks. The Execution Plan based approach detects SQLIA in the stored procedures effectively. 
The well-developed model of Execution Plans not only aids in the consistency of the detection 
algorithm but also reduces the complexity of the detection algorithm. 
The Execution Plan approach detects SQLIA at the lowest possible level i.e. after 
Execution Plan is generated for a query. The Execution Plan algorithm just uses the schema of the 
database to detect SQLIA. Hence organizations need not share their data while implementing the 
Execution Plan based approach. The Execution Plan approach does not depend on the language in 
which the web site is developed as it detects SQLIA from the database. 
The false positive and false negative rates can be improved widely using the Execution 
Plan approach. Even though Execution Plans are pertinent only to SQL Server databases, the 
concept of detecting SQLIA using the plan developed by the query optimizer can be implemented 
in any database. 
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Future Work 
As noted above, the Execution Plan approach can be only used in detecting SQLIA in SQL 
Server databases. This approach can be extended to detect SQLIA in other databases as well.  
Finding alternates of Execution Plans  
Although the Execution Plans are used only in SQL Server databases, equivalent of 
Execution Plans can be found in other databases. Every database server prepares a query plan 
before executing the query. This query plan can be used in detecting SQLIA. For e.g. Oracle 
creates Explain Plan that represent the query plan developed by the query optimizer. 
Unifying the query plans 
Even though all the databases generate query plans before executing the query, the 
properties of each of these plans may differ. Also the ease of access of the effectiveness of each of 
these plans may differ. If the approach of generating query plans from the databases can be unified, 
the approach of detecting SQLIA can be unified. 
Updating the Execution Plans 
The Execution plans can be updated with more parameters that can be used in detecting 
SQLIA. 
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